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CHAPTER 22
Social Security Reform: An Analysis of
the Ball/Altman Three-Point Plan
KATHRYN L. MOORE
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INTRODUCTION

In light of Social Security’s long-term funding deficit,1 Robert Ball, a
long-serving former Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, has
proposed a three part plan that would bring the Social Security system into close
actuarial balance.2 The first part of the plan consists of gradually increasing the
maximum earnings base until it reaches 90 percent of earnings.3 The second part
of the plan calls for dedicating the estate tax to funding Social Security beginning
in 2010,4 and the third part of the plan consists of investing a portion of the Social
Security trust fund in equities.5 Nancy Altman, Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Pension Rights Center and assistant to Alan Greenspan when he
served as Chairman of the bipartisan National Commission on Social Security
Reform from 1981 to 1983, endorsed the plan in her recent book, The Battle for
Social Security: From FDR’s Vision to Bush’s Gamble.6
This Article analyzes the costs and benefits of this three part plan.

1

The Social Security Trustees project that by 2017, the Social system will begin collecting less
in contributions than it owes in benefits, and by 2040, the Trust Fund will be exhausted. Board of
Trustees of Fed. Old Age and Survivors Ins. and Disa. Tr. Funds, 2006 Annual Report 2 [hereinafter
2006 Trustees’ Report].
2

Robert M. Ball, The Social Security Protection Plan: How we can cope — calmly — with the
system’s long-term shortfall (Jan. 2006). Close actuarial balance is defined as income within
plus-or-minus 5 percent of outgo over the next 75 years. Nancy J. Altman, The Battle for Social
Security: From FDR’s Vision to Bush’s Gamble (2005).
3

Ball, supra note 2, at 2–3.

4

Id. at 3–4.

5

Id. at 4–6.

6

Altman, supra note 2, at 297–306.
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§ 22.02

§ 22.02

INCREASING THE MAXIMUM EARNINGS BASE7

Current law imposes on both employees8 and employers9 a tax of 6.2 percent
of wages, up to a maximum taxable wage base,10 indexed to the increase in
average wages nationwide and equal to $97,500 in 2007,11 to finance Social
Security benefits.12 Under current law, the maximum taxable wage base also
serves as a benefits base which establishes the maximum amount of earnings that
are used to calculate benefits.13 In 2007, the benefit for an individual who earned
the maximum taxable wage for at least 35 years (the number of years on which
benefits are based) and retired at the full retirement age (65 and 10 months for
workers reaching age 65 in 2007), is equal to $2,116 per month or $25,392 per
year.14
Robert Ball and Nancy Altman recommend that, in addition to the automatic
annual increases in the maximum taxable wage under current law, the maximum
taxable wage base (for purposes of both taxes and benefits) be gradually increased
until the base covers 90 percent of all wages paid to covered employees.15 (A
wage base that covers 90 percent of wages would be about $150,000 in 2005.)16
Specifically, they propose that the maximum taxable wage base be increased by 2
percent each year (in addition to the currently scheduled automatic increases due
to the growth in average wages) until the base reaches 90 percent of taxable
payroll.17 Under their proposed approach, it would take about 40 years to reach
the 90 percent level.18
7

This section is based on Section V.A. of Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform:
Fundamental Restructuring or Incremental Change, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).
8

26 U.S.C. Sec. 3101(a).

9

26 U.S.C. Sec. 3111(a).

10

26 U.S.C. Sec. 3121(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 430(a).

11

Social Security Administration, Fact Sheet: 2007 Social Security Changes, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2007.htm.
12

The self-employed are required to pay similar taxes. 26 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(a).

13

42 U.S.C. Sec. 430.

14

Social Security Administration, Fact Sheet: 2007 Social Security Changes, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2007.htm.
15

Ball, supra note 2, at 2; Altman, supra note 2, at 302 (describing and endorsing Ball proposal).

16

Debra Whitman, Social Security: Raising or Eliminating the Taxable Earnings Base, CRS
Report for Congress CRS-6 (May 2, 2005).
17

Ball, supra note 2, at 2. Altman, supra note 2, at 302.

18

Ball, supra note 2, at 2.
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Ball notes that under current law, only about 83 percent of earnings are taxed
today.19 He asserts that Congress affirmed a goal of collecting Social Security tax
on 90 percent of all covered earnings in 1983, and that the current law automatic
adjustment in wages has not worked as planned, because wages for the higher paid
have increased much more rapidly than average wages.20 He proposes that the
taxable wage base be gradually increased to “get [] back to the practice of
collecting the Social Security tax on 90 percent of all covered earnings.”21 Ball
recommends that the increase be gradual to minimize its impact on the workers
subject to the higher wage base.22 Specifically, he states that under his proposed
gradual approach “deductions from earnings for the highest-paid 6 percent of
workers would simply continue for a few days longer into the year . . . Such a
gradual adjustment would be virtually painless.”23
This section begins by providing a brief history of the Social Security
maximum taxable wage base. It then discusses the costs and benefits of the
proposed gradual increase in the maximum taxable wage base.
[1]

History of Social Security Maximum Earnings Base

As originally drafted, the Roosevelt Administration’s proposal did not include
a maximum taxable wage base. Rather, in its original proposal, President Franklin
Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security excluded from coverage nonmanual workers with monthly wages of $250 or more.24 Presumably, the
committee excluded these high wage workers because the program’s drafters were
focused on alleviating the poverty a large number of people faced at the time, and
they were not concerned with high wage workers.25
The maximum taxable wage base first appeared in a bill reported by the House
19

Ball, supra note 2, at 2.

20

Ball, supra note 2, at 2.

21

Ball, supra note 2, at 2.

22

Ball, supra note 2, at 2.

23

Ball, supra note 2, at 2.

24

Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, reprinted in Report of the
Committee on Economic Security of 1935, and other Basic Documents Relating to the Development
of the Social Security Act 25, 45 (50th Ann. ed. 1985).
25
Whitman, supra note 16, at CRS-1. (“Being in the midst of the Depression, the Administration’s attention was on the large number of aged people living in poverty. . . . Not concerned about
high-income retirees, the Administration’s proposal exempted non-manual workers earning $250 or
more a month from coverage (i.e., $3,000 on an annual basis). Manual workers were to be covered
regardless of their earnings, but few had earnings above this level.”)
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§ 22.02[1]

Ways and Means Committee.26 The Committee replaced the exemption for high
wage workers with a maximum taxable base, which it set at $3,000 per year
(which equals $250 per month).27 Although the Committee report did not provide
a clear explanation for replacing the high wage exemption with a taxable wage
base, Debra Whitman of the Congressional Research Service speculates that the
Committee may have added the taxable wage base to promote administrative ease
and tax equity.28 Excluding high wage workers could have created administrative
difficulties for workers whose earnings fluctuated above and below the $250
monthly threshold. In addition, low and average wage workers may have objected
to paying taxes from which high wage workers were exempt.29
When the Social Security program was ultimately enacted in 1935, it included
a maximum taxable wage base set at $3,000.30 When the taxes were first collected
in 1937, the $3,000 threshold taxed 92 percent of all wages in covered
employment,31 and 96.9 percent of covered workers were taxed on all of their
wages;32 that is, only 3.1 percent of covered workers had wages that exceeded the
taxable wage base.
The maximum taxable wage base was increased on an ad hoc basis six times
between 1935 and 1972.33 Then, in 1972, Congress amended the Social Security
program so that the benefit formula (including the taxable wage and benefit base)
was indexed to adjust automatically to changes in the cost of living.34
In light of the rampant inflation at the time, the indexing formula turned out to

26

Id. at CRS-1.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id. at CRS-2. (“The committee’s report and floor statements made at the time give no clear
record as to the reasoning for the taxable limit, but concerns about tax equity and attaining as much
program coverage of the workforce as possible were suggested as factors for rejecting the
high-earner exemption. Not covering them meant that they would not pay the tax where lower wage
earners would, and coverage would be erratic for workers whose earnings fluctuated above and
below the $250 monthly threshold.)
30

P. L. No. 74-271, Sec. 811(a) (1935)

31

2005 Annual Statistical Supplement, Table 4.B1, at 4.12.

32

2005 Annual Statistical Supplement, Table 4.B4, at 4.18.

33

See 2006 Annual Report, supra note, at 125 (showing that contribution base was increased to
$3,600 in 1951, $4,200 in 1955, $4,800 in 1959, $6,600 in 1966, $7,800 in 1968, $9,000 in 1972).
34

Pub. L. No. 92-336, Sec. 202, 86 Stat. 412, 493–503 (1972).
(Rel.065S–8/2007

Pub.500)

0006

[ST: 1] [ED: 10000] [REL: 065S]
Composed: Tue Jul 24 15:45:33 EDT 2007
XPP 7.3C.1 Patch #3 SC_01125 nllp 500 [PW=500pt PD=684pt TW=360pt TD=514pt]
VER: [SC_01125-Local:17 Jul 07 16:25][MX-SECNDARY: 31 May 07 19:37][TT-: 07 Jun 07 18:35 loc=usa unit=00500-ch0022s]
0

§ 22.02[1]

REVIEW

OF

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

22-6

be flawed,35 and Congress amended the formula in 1977.36 In addition, because
the Social Security program faced both short-term and long-time financing
difficulties at that time, Congress enacted four separate increases in the maximum
taxable wage base to help address the system’s deficit.37 The increases were
designed so that the taxable wage base would cover 90 percent of all wages by
1982.38 The House Ways and Means Committee Report explains,
Your committee’ bill provides for increasing the contribution and benefit base
— in four steps — to a level where about 90 percent of all payroll in covered
employment would be taxable for social security purposes (and about 93
percent of all workers would have their full earnings credited for benefit
purposes.) When the social security program began in 1937, about 92.5
percent of all payroll in covered employment was covered, and about 97
percent of the workers in covered employment had their full earnings counted
for benefit purposes. Your committee believes that it would be desirable to
move toward taxing a higher proportion of total payroll in covered employment than the 85 percent that is now taxable.39
Moreover, “[a]s a result of the automatic adjustment,” it was expected that “the
proportion of total payroll covered by the base [would] be eliminated at a constant
level over the long run.”40 That prediction, however, has not turned out to be true.
Due in large part to the fact that salaries for top earners grew faster than for lower
wage workers,41 the share of earnings subject to the tax has decreased from 90
percent of all earnings in 1982 to just under 85 percent in 2004,42 and is expected
to further decrease to 83 percent of all earnings by 201543 and remain stable
35

See Henry J. Aaron and Robert D. Reischauer, Countdown to Reform 83 (1998).

36

P. L. No. 95-216, Sec. 201, 91 Stat. 1509, 1514 (1977).

37

These changes were contained in Title I of the Act, entitled “Provisions relating to the
Financing of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program.” 91 Stat. 1509 & 1510.
38

P.L. 95-216, § 103 (increasing the base to $17,700 in 1978, $22,900 in 1979, $25,900 in 1980,
and $29,700 in 1981).
39

Social Security Amendments of 1977, House Report No. 95-102, Part I 18, reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4155, 4175.
40
Social Security Amendments of 1977, House Report No. 95-102, Part I 18, reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4155, 4175.
41

Whitman, supra note 16, at CRS-3.

42

Social Security Administration, 2005 Annual Statistical Supplement, Table 4.B1, at
4.12–4.13.
43
See Virginia P. Reno and Joni Lavery, Options to Balance Social Security Funds Over the
Next 75 Years, National Academy of Social Security Brief No.18, at 3 (Feb. 2005).
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thereafter.44 On the other hand, the share of workers who have income that
exceeds the taxable wage base has remained at a relatively constant 5 or 6 percent
since the 1980s.45
[2]
[a]

Costs and Benefits of Increasing the Maximum Earnings Base
Reducing the Long-Term Deficit

The most obvious benefit of the proposed increase in the taxable wage base is
its potential to reduce Social Security’s long-term deficit. According to Social
Security Administration projections, the Ball/Altman proposal to gradually
increase the taxable wage base over a forty year period would reduce the
long-range actuarial deficit from its then level of 1.9 percent of payroll to 1.3
percent of payroll.46 If the maximum taxable wage base were increased faster, it
would reduce even more of the system’s long-range actuarial deficit.47
Opponents of proposals to increase the taxable wage base do not deny that
increasing the taxable wage base would reduce Social Security’s long-term
actuarial deficit. They contend, however, that reducing the system’s long-term
actuarial deficit is essentially meaningless48 because adding money to Social
Security’s trust fund “does nothing to change Social Security’s actual solvency.”49
Rather, they contend that “[a] far better measure of Social Security’s finances and
the impact of changes such as raising the tax cap is the annual cash-flow surplus
or deficit, that is, the yearly gap between Social Security’s revenues and
expenditures.”50 If the taxable wage base were increased as Ball and Altman have

44

Whitman, supra note 16, at CRS-5.

45

Whitman, supra note 16, at CRS-3.

46

Ball, supra note 2, at 2; Social Security Administration Memorandum, Estimated OASDI
Financial Effects for a Proposal With Six Provisions That Would Improve Social Security Financing
(April 14, 2005).
47

Ball, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that implementing the change over 10 years rather than 40
years would reduce the deficit by .1 percent of payroll rather than .6 percent of payroll).
48
See, e.g., Michael Tanner, Cato Inst., Keep the Cap: Why a Tax Increase Will Not Save Social
Security 5 (June 8, 2005) (“[T]hose claims [that removing the wage cap would reduce Social
Security’s long-term deficit] are based on a fundamental fallacy: the assumption that Social Security
surpluses accumulated today can be saved through the Social Security Trust Fund.”)
49

Id. at 6.

50

Tanner, supra note 48, at 6. See also Raising the Social Security Taxable Earnings Cap: Real
Reform or Another Placebo?, The Concord Coalition’s Series on Social Security Reform Issue 9, at
5 (July 6, 2005) (“What matter most to the economy and budget is not the 75-year aggregate impact
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proposed, the Social Security system would begin to run cash-flow deficits in
2021,51 just four years after the system is projected to run cash-flow deficits under
current law.52 Opponents argue that increasing the taxable wage base would
increase taxes with little offsetting benefit.53
[b]

Addressing Earnings Inequality

As discussed above, Ball contends that gradually increasing the taxable wage
base until it reaches 90 percent of taxable earnings would address the growing
inequality of wages in the United States and restore the system to a goal Congress
affirmed in 1983.54 Opponents of increasing the taxable wage base do not dispute
that over the last twenty years “earnings have risen most rapidly for workers at the
top of the earnings distribution, that is, among those workers who were already
receiving the highest earnings.”55 Instead, opponents of increasing the taxable
wage base note that historically the share of earnings subject to the Social Security
tax has varied widely, ranging from a low of 71.3 percent in 1965 to a high of 92.4
percent in 1940,56 with the percentage below 85 percent more than half the years
the Social Security tax has been in effect.57 Critics of increasing the taxable wage
base contend that there is no normatively appropriate level to set the maximum
taxable wage base and thus the wage base need not be increased to address
increasing earnings inequality.58
on the trust funds of raising the tax cap but how much it would reduce Social Security’s annual cash
deficits as they emerge and grow over time.”) Matt Moore, Eliminating the Social Security Payroll
Tax Cap: A Bad Idea, National Center for Policy Analysis No. 470 (March 23, 2004).
51

Tanner, supra note 48, at 7.

52

See 2006 Annual Report, supra note, at 2.

53

Tanner, supra note 48. Concord Coalition, supra note 50, at 5–6 (“As the table shows, even
the most extreme of the three measures (eliminating the cap without crediting additional earnings)
would not generate enough revenues to cover the future Social Security cash deficits.”); Matt Moore,
supra note 50, at 2 (“While eliminating the Social Security payroll tax cap would reduce the funding
gap somewhat, it has only a marginal effect and comes with a huge economic cost.”).
54

Ball, supra note 2, at 2. See also Altman, supra note 2, at 301–02 (discussing history of
taxable wage base).
55
Peter A. Diamond and Peter R. Orszag, Saving Social Security: A Balanced Approach 64
(2004).
56

Social Security Administration, 2005 Annual Statistical Supplement, Table 4.B1, at 4.12.

57

Concord Coalition, supra note 50, at 3. See also Gareth G. Davis and D. Mark Wilson, The
Impact of Removing Social Security’s Tax Cap on Wages, A Report of the Heritage Center for Data
Analysis, CDA99-01, at 3-4 (Jan. 19, 1999); Tanner, supra note 48, at 2.
58

Concord Coalition, supra note 50, at 3. See also Tanner, supra note 48, at 2
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[c]

§ 22.02[2][c]

Impact on Workers and the Economy

Ball and Altman contend that their proposed increase in the taxable wage base
would only affect the highest-paid 6 percent of workers, and if gradually phased
in over time, could significantly reduce Social Security long-term deficit with little
noticeable pain.59 Under current law, employers are required to collect the
employee’s share of the Social Security tax from the employee’s wages as and
when the wages are paid.60 For employees who earn less than the taxable wage
base, Social Security taxes are collected throughout the year. For the 6 percent or
so of workers whose wages exceed the taxable wage base, Social Security taxes
are collected each pay period until wages reach the taxable wage base. For the
remaining weeks or months of the year (depending on the employee’s total
wages), no Social Security taxes are collected from the employee’s wages. Thus,
under the Ball/Altman proposal to gradually increase the taxable wage base by 2
percent per year over the currently scheduled increases until the base reaches 90
percent of wages, “deductions from earnings for the highest-paid 6 percent of
workers would simply continue a few days longer into the year. . . Such a
gradual adjustment would be virtually painless. . .”61
Opponents of increasing the taxable wage base assert that “[i]n the end,
proposals for changing the taxable wage cap are all pain and no gain.”62 Critics
ignore the possibility of gradually increasing the wage base to 90 percent of
covered wages as Ball and Altman have proposed. Instead, they focus on
proposals to immediately eliminate the taxable wage base and decry such as a
change as constituting “the largest tax increase in American history — some $461
billion over the first five years alone.”63
Again, focusing solely on the possibility of immediately eliminating the wage

59

Ball, supra note 2, at 2.

60

26 C.F.R. Sec. 31.3102-1.

61

Ball, supra note 2, at 2. Diamond and Orszag would also phase in their “reform over an
extended period of time to allow workers time to adjust to the change.” Diamond and Orszag, supra
note 55, at 86.
62

Tanner, supra note 48, at 1.

63

See Matt Moore, supra note 50, at 2. See also Tanner, supra note 48, at 4 (claiming that
elimination of wage cap would result in $472 billion tax increase); Concord Coalition, supra note
50, at 6 (asserting that elimination of wage cap would amount to more than $1.3 trillion in new taxes
over next ten years); Davis and Wilson, supra note 57, at 5 (“Eliminating the Social Security taxable
wage cap would result in the largest tax increase in U.S. — $425.2 billion over five years, or $367
billion in 1998 inflation-adjusted dollars.”).
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cap,64 critics contend that such a change would harm the economy in at least two
ways. First, they contend that eliminating the taxable wage base would reduce the
incentive to work by increasing the marginal tax rate on labor.65 “Should Social
Security’s tax cap be removed, many workers will immediately find that federal
taxes alone consume almost 55 cents of every additional dollar they earn from
employment.”66 In addition, critics contend that increasing the taxable wage base
would reduce national savings because the tax increase would reduce the after-tax
income of those workers who are most able to save.67
[3]

Recommendation

I support the Ball/Altman proposal that the taxable wage base be gradually
increased to 90 percent of taxable payroll. The first, and most important, reason
for increasing the taxable wage base is that it would reduce Social Security’s
long-term actuarial deficit. While critics of increasing the taxable wage base are
right that in many ways Social Security’s annual cash-flow position is more
important than its long-term deficit, reducing the long-term deficit is not
meaningless.68 Moreover, gradually increasing the taxable wage base would in
fact improve the system’s annual cash flow position by increasing tax receipts,

64

Cf. Rea S. Hederman, Jr., et al., Keep the Social Security Wage Cap: Nearly a Million Jobs
Hang in the Balance, A Report for the Heritage Center for Data Analysis, CDA05-04, at 2 n.8 (April
20, 2005). (“The same number (and type) of workers would be affected by either an increase in or
the outright elimination of the taxable wage cap. Only the magnitude of the tax increase and its
impact on family budgets and the economy would suffer.”)
65

See, e.g., Matt Moore, supra note 50, at 2 (“increasing the marginal tax rate will have adverse
economic consequences.”); John Kyl, We Can’t Tax Our Way Out of the Social Security Crisis (Feb.
8, 2005) (“Moreover, increasing or eliminating the wage cap would stunt the growth of the entire
national economy.”); Davis and Wilson, supra note 57, at 5 (“An increase in the marginal tax rate
on labor income would damage the economy by reducing the incentive to work.”).
66

Davis and Wilson, supra note 57, at 5.

67

See, e.g., Tanner, supra note 48, at 5; Davis and Wilson, supra note 57, at 8. Indeed, Davis
and Wilson contend that increasing the taxable wage base would also reduce charitable contributions
by reducing the after-tax income of the workers who contribute the most to charity. Davis and
Wilson, supra note 57, at 8–9 (“removing the maximum taxable wage cap would reduce charitable
contributions by $15.5 billion . . . from 2000 to 2004, or 1.9 percent of all charitable giving over
the same period”).
68

Cf. Alicia H. Munnell, Are the Social Security Trust Funds Meaningless, Center for
Retirement Research at Boston College Issue Brief No. 30 (May 2005) (explaining that accumulating a surplus in the Social Security trust funds is meaningful if it results in increased national
savings).
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particularly in later years when the system will be in the greatest need of increased
revenues.
Second, increasing the taxable wage base makes sense in light of the growing
inequality of wages in the United States. The legislative history of the taxable
wage base shows that there is no single, normatively accurate level for the taxable
wage.69 Nevertheless, 90 percent of wages seems reasonable.
I agree with the critics that increasing the taxable wage base would not be
entirely painless, particularly for the 6 percent or so of workers who would be
required to pay increased taxes. That, however, does not mean that the proposal
should be rejected. There is simply no entirely painless way to address Social
Security’s long-term deficit. Gradually increasing the base over a long period of
time should help to minimize the pain for these individuals. Moreover, while it is
possible that gradually increasing the taxable wage base and thus increasing the
marginal tax rate on labor would decrease work effort, it is unlikely to have a very
significant impact. Under the Ball/Altman proposal to gradually increase the
taxable wage base, Social Security taxes would simply be collected, at most, for
an additional week each year.70 It is hard to imagine that such a variation in take
home pay would have a significant impact on work effort. I do not believe that the
risk of reduced labor supply outweighs the benefit of reducing Social Security’s
long-term deficit.
§ 22.03

DEDICATING THE ESTATE TAX71

Currently, the Social Security trust fund72 is funded principally by dedicated
payroll taxes.73 Specifically, in 2005, net payroll taxes accounted for 84 percent

69
Congress explicitly selected 90 percent as the level in 1977, but it did not offer any normative
justification for the 90 percent. See Social Security Amendments of 1977, House Report No. 95-102,
Part I 18, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4155, 4175.
70
See Altman, supra note 2, at 302 (“Those earning at or above the maximum taxable wage base
would have the same tax rate provided under present law deducted from wages a bit longer in the
year - one additional week a year, at most.”).
71
This section is based on Section IV.B. of Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform:
Fundamental Restructuring or Incremental Change, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).
72
For these purposes, the term “Social Security Trust Fund” refers to the Old Age Survivors
Insurance Trust Fund. The percentages for the Disability Insurance Trust Fund are similar though
not identical.
73

See 26 U.S.C. Secs. 1401(a), 3111(a), 3101,
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of the Social Security trust fund’s income.74 Interest on the Social Security Trust
Fund’s surplus accounted for 14 percent of the trust fund’s income,75 and revenue
from federal income tax imposed on certain Social Security benefits accounted for
two percent of the trust fund’s income.76
Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA),77 the estate tax exemption is scheduled to gradually increase from $1
million in 2002 to $3.5 million (or $7 million for a couple) in 2009, and be
abolished in 2010.78 EGTRRA, however, includes a “sunset” clause which causes
the entire Act to expire in 2011.79 Thus, under current law, the estate tax will be
revived at its 2000 levels beginning in 2011.80 President Bush, and many
Republicans, call for the permanent abolition of the estate tax beginning no later
than 2010.81 In the second part of their three part plan, Ball and Altman advocate
freezing the estate tax at the 2009 level and earmarking the proceeds for Social
Security from 2010 on.82
This section outlines the costs and benefits of dedicating the estate tax to
funding Social Security.
[1]

Public Perception of Social Security as an “Earned Right”

The creators of the Social Security program chose to finance Social Security

74

2006 Trustees’ Report, supra note 1, at 4.

75

2006 Trustees’ Report, supra note 1, at 4.

76

2006 Trustees’ Report, supra note 1, at 5.

77

Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat.
38 (2001).
78

Pub. L. No. 107-16, Secs. 501–521, 115 Stat. 38, 69–72 (2001).

79

Pub. L. No. 107-16, Sec. 901(a); 115 Stat. 150 (2001).

80

Pub. L. No. 107-16, Sec. 901(b); 115 Stat. 150 (2001). Virtually everyone expects some sort
of change in the estate tax between now and 2011. The question is what form it will take. Cf.
Diamond and Orszag, supra note 55, at 94.
81

Leonard E. Burman, et al., Options to Reform the Estate Tax, 2005 TNT 61-17 (March 31,
2005) (“The president and many members of Congress would like to repeal the [estate] tax
permanently, and many would like to do so before 2010.”)
82

See Ball, supra note 2, at 3; Altman, supra note 2, at 299–301 (endorsing Ball’s proposal).
Although not part of their three part plan, Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag also support using the
estate tax to fund a portion of Social Security benefits. Diamond and Orszag, supra note 55, at
93–96.
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benefits with “contributions” or payroll taxes83 because they believed that payroll
tax financing would give workers a “right” to benefits and garner long-term
support for the system.84 Indeed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt told a reporter:
Those taxes were never a problem of economics. They are politics all the way
through. We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors
a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their
unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever
scrap my social security program.85
Arguably, earmarking estate tax revenues for Social Security could reduce
public support for Social Security by weakening the public’s perception of the
program as an “earned right.”86 Earmarking estate tax revenues, however, need
83

Under the Social Security Act as originally enacted, Social Security benefits were not directly
funded with payroll taxes. In order to avoid a constitutional challenge to the Social Security
program,
Title II of the Social Security Act created “an account in the Treasury of the United States to be
known as the ‘Old-Age Reserve Account.’ ” Title VIII of the Social Security Act imposed taxes
on employers and employees. These taxes were paid into the general fund. But the legislation
went on to authorize an annual appropriation from the general fund to the Old-Age Reserve
Account in the exact amount of the proceeds from the Title VIII tax.
Altman, supra note 2, at 82–83. In 1939, however, the Social Security Act was amended to provide
for direct funding of Social Security benefits with payroll contributions. See P. L. No. 76-379, Sec.
201, 53 Stat. 1360, 1362 (1939). See also 42 U.S.C. Sec. 201.
84

See authorities cited in Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 Temple
L. Rev. 131, 141 n. 63 (1998).
85
See Moore, supra note 84, at 141 and authorities cited therein. Cf. Milton Friedman, Payroll
Taxes, No; General Revenues, Yes, in The Crisis in Social Security 25, 28 (M. Boskin ed., 1977)
(“The imaginative packaging has served a very important political function: it has made the public
at large willing to pay much heavier taxes than they otherwise would have been willing to bear; it
has made them willing to accept a capricious system of benefits and to support a mammoth
bureaucracy that could never have arisen separately. The ultimate effect has been to foster the
growth of government and, above all, of central government.”).
86
Cf. Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Special Committee on Aging March
27, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2000/20000327.htm
(“One argument was that using general revenues would blur the distinction between the social
security system, which was viewed as a social insurance program, and other government spending
programs.”); Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security, Vol. II: Reports of the
Technical Panels on Trends and Issues in Retirement Savings, Technical Panel on Assumptions and
Methods and Presentations to Council 83 (“On the other hand introducing general revenues to
balance the system would substantially change the nature of Social Security, and it might also
eventually erode public support. The additional use of general revenues would change the public’s
perception of Social Security benefits as earned rights, and might further politicize Social Security
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not have such an effect.
Social Security’s characterization as an earned right helps to distinguish it from
public assistance.87 Public assistance is based on “the right to a minimum standard
of living based on membership in a civilized community.”88 Social Security, a
form of social insurance, is based on participation in the labor market.89 As Robert
Ball has explained, Social Security’s characterization as an earned right does not
require “that the entire cost of the benefit be paid for by earmarked contributions
or that the benefit amounts be in direct proportion to the worker’s own
contributions.”90
Indeed, current Social Security benefits are not financed entirely by payroll
taxes. Rather, as discussed above, interest on the Social Security trust fund’s
surplus accounts for 14 percent of the trust fund’s income, and revenue from
federal income tax imposed on certain Social Security benefits accounts for two
percent of the trust fund’s income. Based on the Social Security actuaries’
projections, freezing the estate tax at the 2009 level would raise approximately
$18 billion in 2010,91 or about 2.5 percent of the OASDI’s total income in 2005.92
Such a relatively minor contribution to Social Security’s income need not have a
significant impact on the public’s perception of and support for the program.
[2]

Funding “Legacy Costs” with Estate Tax

One of the most significant, if not the most significant, reasons underlying
Social Security’s long-term deficit, is what Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag refer
to as the system’s “legacy cost” or “legacy debt.”93 This legacy cost arises from
by drawing it explicitly into annual budget debates.”).
87

Insuring the Essentials: Bob Ball on Social Security: A Selection of Articles and Essays from
1942 through 2000 by Robert Ball 43–45 (Thomas N. Bethell, ed., 2000). For additional discussion
of the distinction between social insurance and social assistance, see Altman, supra note 2, at 32–33.
88

Id. at 43.

89

Id.

90

Id. at 44.

91

Social Security Administration Memorandum, supra note 46, at Table 2d.

92

Total income for the OASDI trust funds was $701.8 billion in 2005. 2006 Annual Report, at
4. Thus, estate tax revenues would only represent 18/701.8 or about 2.5 percent of the trust funds’
income, a little more than the $14.9 billion currently received from the taxation of benefits. See id.
93

Diamond and Orszag, supra note 55, at 6–7. See also Kathryn L. Moore, President Bush’s
Personal Retirement Account: Saving or Dismantling Social Security, N.Y.U. Rev. of Employee
Benefits and Executive Compensation 5-1, 5-7-5-11 (2005) (discussing three factors that contribute
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the fact that Social Security, like most social insurance systems, paid the first
generations of retirees far more than their contributions to the system could
finance.94 As Robert Ball has explained:
Financing the old-age survivors insurance program presents difficulties
largely because persons retiring in the first 5, 10, 15, or even 20 years of the
program cannot be expected to contribute at a high enough rate to accumulate
a sum that would provide reasonably adequate benefits. Yet for sound social
reasons we are not willing to postpone adequate payments under the social
insurance program to the time when the amounts accumulated would cover
the cost of such payments.95
According to calculations by economists John Geanakoplos, Olivia Mitchell, and
Stephen Zeldes, as a group, the Social Security beneficiaries born before 1937
received about $10 trillion more in benefits than the economic value of their
contributions to the system.96
The Ball/Altman proposal to earmark estate tax revenue to finance Social
Security has intrinsic appeal. It requires some members of the earlier generations
of Social Security beneficiaries to use some of their legacies to help pay for the
“legacy debt” created for the benefit of their generations. Of course, it is not a
perfect fit. First, many of the early retirees have already died and thus would not
be required to use their legacies to pay for the legacy debt.97 More importantly, the
estate tax, whether it is frozen at the 2009 level (with a $3.5 million exemption for
individuals or $7 million exemption for couples)98 or returned to the 2000 level,
significantly to Social Security’s long-term deficit: (1) increasing life expectancy, (2) the fact that
the baby boom generation is reaching retirement age and is followed by a much smaller generation,
and (3) the legacy debt).
94

See Insuring the Essentials, supra note 87, at 210 (“Most social insurance programs also give
to the workers retiring in the early years of the program benefits that are much greater than can be
bought by the contributions paid for their age group. This was true of the old-age benefit program
under the original Social Security Act, passed in 1935; and in the 1939 amendments, older workers
were given even larger benefits in relation to their contributions.”).
95

See Id. at 210.

96

John Geanakoplos, et al., Would a Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate
of Return?, in Framing the Social Security Debate: Values, Politics and Economics 137, 146 (R.
Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998).
97

Cf. Moore, supra note 93, at 5-9-5-10 (noting that Ida May Fuller, the first recipient of
monthly Social Security benefits, died in 1975 at age 100).
98
Cf. Gene Sperling et al., Repeal/Reform of the Estate Tax (June 30, 2005) (noting that by
2009, less than 0.3 percent of estates will owe any estate tax), available at http://
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would only affect a tiny percentage of Social Security beneficiaries. Nevertheless,
there is something appealing about using legacies to pay for a legacy debt.
[3]

Advisability of Repealing the Estate Tax

The estate tax is a remarkably unpopular tax. Although it only affects a very
small percentage of the population,99 most Americans object to the tax.100
Michael Graetz believes this anomaly may be due to the unflappable optimism of
most Americans: most people must believe that they will be among the one to two
percent richest in the nation when they die.101 Yet, surprisingly, according to a
survey by the U.S. Trust, more than half of the affluent (defined as Americans in
the top one percent of income and thus most likely to be affected by the estate tax)
believe that the federal estate tax should not be repealed, but that it should be
continued at the rate of 18 percent.102
Whether the estate tax should be repealed has been the subject of major debate
in recent years.103 Indeed, as Richard Kaplan has noted, “entire forests have been
www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.aspx?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=860671&printmode=1.
99

See Diane Lim Rogers, “Death Tax” Repeal Unfair to Those Who Owe “Birth Tax,” San
Francisco Chronicle (May 31, 2006) (noting that according to the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy
Center’s estimates, in 2006, there will only be 12,600 taxable estates — thus a tax will be only be
assessed on 1/2 of 1 percent of all deaths in 2006); Barry W. Johnson and Jacob M. Mikow, Federal
Estate Tax Returns, 1998-2000, in IRS Statistics of Income Bulletin, Publication 1136, Spring 2002
(Rev. 5-02) (noting that an estimated 103,982 Federal estate tax returns were filed for individuals
who died in 1998, that the returns represented 4.4 percent of all individuals who died that year, and
less than half of the returns reported any tax liability); Barry W. Johnson and Martha Britton Eller,
Federal Taxation of Inheritance and Wealth Transfers 19 Table 6 (March 2001) (showing
percentage of adult deaths with taxable estate never exceeded 6 percent between 1934 and 1993, and
in most years was less than 2 percent), paper prepared for 1997 American Statistical Association
Conference and available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=112193,00.html.
100

See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Erin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of tax
Counsel: Erin Griswold’s Tax Law — and Ours, 56 Tax Law. 173, 175 (2002) (noting that
according to a Zogby poll, the public favored repeal of the estate tax by a 71-29% margin); Deborah
Geier, The Death of the “Death Tax”?: An Introduction, 48 Clev. St. L. Rev. 653, 653 (2000) (“A
June, 2000, Gallup poll, for example, indicated that 60% of those polled favored elimination of the
estate tax ‘even though only 17% [believed that] they would personally benefit.’ ”); Dennis J.
Ventry, Jr., Straight Talk about the ‘Death’ Tax: Politics, Economics, and Morality, 89 Tax Notes
1159, 1159–60 (2000) (“In surveys conducted in late August and early September, the Pew Research
Center reported that 71 percent of respondents favored ‘eliminating the inheritance tax.’ ”).
101

Graetz, supra note 100, at 175.

102

Anonymous, A few thoughts, Beacon Hill Times 14 (July 18, 2006), 2006 WLNR 13326073.

103

See, e.g., Rethinking Estate and Gift Taxation (William G. Gale et al. eds. 2001); Edward J.
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decimated in the process.”104 A comprehensive analysis of the estate tax105 goes
well beyond the scope of this article. I will simply try to highlight some of the
principle arguments presented in the debate.
When Congress introduced the estate tax in 1916, it was said to have had two
purposes: (1) to break up concentrations of wealth,106 and (2) to produce
revenue.107 In recent years, a third goal or purpose has been attributed to the estate
tax: adding progressivity to the federal tax system.108
Critics of the estate tax contend that it has done little to break up concentrations
McCaffery et al., Should We End Life Support for Death Taxes?, 88 Tax Notes 1373 (2000);
Symposium on Wealth Taxes Part I, 53 Tax L. Rev. 257 (2000); Symposium on Wealth Taexes Part
II, 53 Tax L. Rev. 499 (2000); Ventry, supra note 100; Charles Davenport & Jay A. Soled,
Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-Talk, 84 Tax Notes 591 (1999); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy
Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 Yale L. J. 283 (1994); John E. Donaldson, The Future of
Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
539, 541 (1993); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 Yale L. J. 259
(1983)
104
Richard Kaplan, Crowding Out: Estate Tax Reform and the Elder Law Policy Agenda, 10
Elder L. J. 15, 20 (2002).
105

“Federal law imposes an integrated set of taxes on estates, gifts, and generation-skipping
transfers.” William G. Gale and Joel Slemrod, Overview in Rethinking Estate and Gift Taxation 1,
4 (William G. Gale et al. eds. 2001). Generally, when discussing the estate tax, most commentators
address the gift tax or the entire transfer tax system together. This article will simply refer to the
estate tax, but much of the discussion is applicable to the entire transfer tax system.
106

For an exhaustive discussion of why high concentrations of wealth should be broken up, see
James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 825, 828–50 (2001).
107
See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New
Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1159, 1180 (2006) (“The tax was designed both to raise
revenue and, in the progressive spirit of the times, to break up large concentrations of wealth.”); Jay
A. Soled, Reassigning and Assessing the Role of the Gift Tax, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 401, 402–403 (2003)
(“There were two purposes that underlay the passage of this [estate] tax: to raise revenue and to
impede the buildup of large wealth concentrations); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, “GIFTS,
GAFTS, AND GEFTS” The Income Tax Definition and the Tax Treatment of Private and Charitable
“Gifts and a Principled Policy for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 441,
475 n. 125 (2003) (“A major reason for having estate taxes is to reduce large concentrations of
wealth.”).
108

Whether this is a recent claim or a long-standing defense is actually subject to debate.
Compare Gale and Slemrod, supra note 105, at 29 (“Progressivity has long been a principal
justification for the estate tax.”) with Donaldson, supra note 103, at 541 (“More recently, the system
has been ‘justified’ for its role or potential in adding an element of progressivity to the overall
federal tax system.”).
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of wealth.109 Some proponents of the tax concede that it has done little to break
up the greatest concentrations of wealth110 while other proponents assert that the
tax does in fact decrease dynamic wealth concentration.111 Other proponents of
the tax assert that the failure of the tax to break up large concentrations of wealth
is due to lack of political will, which is “hardly condemnatory of the tax.”112
As for producing revenue, critics of the tax note that it only produces a tiny
percentage of total federal tax revenue (about one percent)113 and may even cost
the federal government more to administer than it collects from the tax.114 Critics
label the tax “voluntary”115 because so many methods have been developed to
avoid it116 and contend that the extraordinary amount of money devoted to
avoiding the tax relative to the revenue collected causes the tax to impose an
unacceptably high social cost.117 Proponents of the estate tax concede that it
produces a relatively small percentage of total tax revenue but contend that critics
overstate the administrative costs associated with the tax.118 Moreover, while the
estate tax may produce a relatively small percentage of total tax revenue, it still
109

Barbara Redman, Rethinking the Progressive Estate and Gift Tax, 15 Akron Tax J. 35, 36
(2000); Donaldson, supra note 103, at 541.
110

Graetz, supra note 103, at 271.

111

See, e.g., Repetti, supra note 106, at 856–59.

112

Davenport and Soled, supra note 103, at 598.

113

McCaffery, supra note 103, at 301.

114

See, e.g., Redman, supra note 109, at 36; McCaffery, supra note 103, at 300–04. For an
overview of the debate regarding administrative issues, see Gale and Slemrod, supra note 105, at
37–43.
115

George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax?: New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax
Avoidance (1979).
116

See, e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes in Rethinking
Estate and Gift Taxation 113, 120–44 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) (describing methods for
avoiding the estate tax and suggesting these devices may reduce the aggregate tax base by about
one-third). It is worth noting that EGTRRA did not address the estate tax’s many loopholes. See
Diamond and Orszag, supra note 55, at 94.
117
Johnson and Eller, supra note 99, at 20 (“The annual costs of estate tax avoidance schemes,
including lawyer fees, accountant fees, costs of subscriptions to estate planning magazines, and
opportunity costs of individuals involved in tax avoidance activities, have been shown to represent
a large percentage of the annual receipts from estate and gift taxes.”); Alicia H. Munnell, Wealth
Transfer Taxation: The Relative Role for Estate and Income Taxes, New England Economic Review
3, 19 (1988) (asserting that tax avoidance costs approach billions of dollars each year which is “an
inordinately high social cost for a tax that only yielded $7.7 billion in 1987.”).
118
See, e.g., Davenport & Soled, supra note 103, at 618–625. See also Repetti, supra note 106,
at 869–72 (stating that cost to IRS in administering tax appears to be proportional to revenues
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raises sizeable dollars;119 by one estimate, permanently repealing the estate tax
would cost the nation $800 billion between 2011 and 2021120 Indeed, earmarking
the estate tax for Social Security would reduce about 20 percent of Social
Security’s seventy-five year actuarial deficit.121
To the extent that the estate tax is borne by decedents,122 it is undoubtedly
progressive.123 At most, only about four percent of decedents must file an estate
tax return, and only about half of those decedents pay any estate tax.124 Thus, at
most, only about the richest 2 percent of the nation’s decedents have taxable
estates.125 Nevertheless, the desirability of progressive taxes in general,126 and
estate taxes in particular127 has been the subject of considerable debate.
generated and noting that with respect to compliance costs, it is difficult to distinguish between costs
incurred to minimize estate taxes and those to provide for orderly succession of property).
119

Graetz, supra note 100, at 175 (“In 1999, fewer than 50,000 taxable estates contributed $28
billion to finance the federal government. Estate tax receipts had been projected to grow to about $40
billion by 2008.”); Repetti, supra note 106, at 852 (finding estate tax revenue significant relative to
income tax revenue collected from low and moderate income individuals).
120

William H. Gates, Sr. & Chuck Collins, Tax the Wealthy: Why America Needs the Estate
Tax, 13 Am. Prospect 20 (Issue 11, June 17, 2002). See also Davenport and Soled, supra note 103,
at 593 (“While not a large percentage of receipts, [transfer taxes] are sufficiently great that
elimination or reduction of them would force some fiscal offset: other taxes would have to be raised;
other taxes could not be cut; borrowing would be greater; or spending would have to be cut.”).
121

Diamond and Orszag, supra note 55, at 94–95. See also Ball, supra note 2, at 4. (stating that
earmarking estate tax revenues would reduce Social Security’s then long-term deficit of 1.9 percent
of payroll (the level at the time of the calculation) to 1.4 percent of payroll).
122

Even if the estate tax is borne by recipients, it may still be viewed as progressive. See Gale
and Slemrod, supra note 105, at 28–29.
123
See Geier, supra note 100, at 654–55 (“[I]t’s undeniable that the estate tax is extremely
progressive for the very reason that it collects tax from fewer than 2% of all decedents each year.”).
But see Donaldson, supra note 103, at 544 (arguing that “[t]he existing transfer tax system simply
cannot be justified by reference to its contribution to progressivity [because it affects such a small
percentage of the decedent population]”).
124

Gale and Slemrod, supra note 105, at 23.

125

Gale and Slemrod, supra note 105, at 23. Indeed, under current law with much higher
exemptions as few as one-half of one percent of decedents are expected to pay the estate tax. See
authorities cited in note, supra.
126
Compare Walter J. Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 60 Taxes 16
(1982); Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1952) with Robert H. Frank & Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society
20–21, 58, 121–23, 212–17 (1995).
127

Compare Davenport and Soled, supra note 103, at 598 (“Because we believe in progressivity
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Critics of the estate tax offer at least two other objections to the estate tax.128
First, and perhaps foremost, critics of the estate tax argue that it has an adverse
effect on savings and investment and thus on capital formation.129 Proponents of
the estate tax claim that the economic studies are equivocal and do not clearly
establish that increased savings will result from the elimination or reduction of
estate taxes.130
In addition, some critics contend that the estate tax hurts small farms and
family-owned businesses.131 “To pay the estate tax after the owner dies, the heirs
we think that the contribution the estate tax makes to it is on the whole good); James R. Repetti, The
Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 Tax Notes 1493, 1500–03 (2000) (by increasing tax burden of
the wealthy, estate tax contributes to progressivity of income tax); Graetz, supra note 103, at 272
(finding that about one-third of the progressivity in the federal tax system is due to the estate tax);
Gates and Collins, supra note 120 (describing estate tax as one of most progressive taxes; “taxing
dead mulitmillionaires is eminently more fair than taxing the no-so-rich living.”) with Redman,
supra note 103 (contending that to the extent that bequest or gift is recognition of and compensation
for past services rendered, progressive taxation loses much of its logic); McCaffery, supra note 103
(favoring progressive consumption tax but not estate tax)
128

For a response to a third argument against the estate tax, that it constitutes double taxation,
see Ruth Carlitz and Joel Friedman, Why the Estate Tax is not “Double Taxation,” Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities (June 17, 2005).
129

Graetz, supra note 103, at 278 (“The basic argument is quite straightforward. Our nation
needs more savings if it is to enjoy economic growth. The estate tax is levied on savings, and taxing
such savings will cause people to save less.”); Johnson and Eller, supra note 99, at 3 (“Opponents
claim that transfer taxation creates a disincentive to accumulate capital and, thus, is detrimental to
the growth of national productivity.”). For an overview of the debate regarding the estate tax’s
effects on saving and labor supply, see Gale and Slemrod, supra note 105, at 43–45.
130

See, e.g., Davenport and Soled, supra note 103, at (“Because of Slemrod’s concern, we
suggest an inquiry into whether taxing the very rich has a special effect on the economy. Short of
that inquiry and results from it, no case has been made for the estate tax having much effect on
savings or capital formation.”); Repetti, supra note 106, at 858–66 (reviewing theory and empirical
studies and finding that most empirical evidence suggests that estate tax does not decrease savings);
Graetz, supra note 103, at 283 (“[o]n balance, . . . the economic evidence available to date simply
fails to make a case for the elimination or reduction of estate and gift taxes on the grounds that
increased savings will result.”) See also Johnson and Eller, supra note 99, at 21 (“There are
economists who also reject the postulate that moderate transfer taxes have an adverse effect on
capital accumulation. Embracing an idea first proposed by the mid-19th century English economist
J.R. McCulloch, they argue that transferors adjust their bequest plans when faced with transfer
taxes.”)
131

Johnson and Eller, supra note 99, at 20 (“Federal transfer taxes are often cited as
impediments to the livelihood of small businesses and farms.”). For an overview of this debate, see
Gale and Slemrod, supra note 105, at 45–50; Congressional Budget Office, Effects of the Federal
Estate Tax on Farms and Small Businesses (July 2005).
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face a stark choice: sell the machinery and go out of business, or make all the
other kinds of cost-cutting decisions — layoffs, deferring new investment — that
hurt the company’s competitiveness.”132 Proponents of the estate tax respond that
the estate tax should have a minimal impact on most small businesses because of
a number of provisions in the estate tax law, including the exemption for small
estates,133 that are intended to provide relief to small business and farms.134
Proponents concede that the law is complex and imperfect, but argue that the law
should be reformed rather than repealed.135
[4]

Recommendation

Overall, I find a great deal of merit in Ball/Altman proposal to earmark estate
tax revenue for Social Security. The estate tax may be imperfect and in need of
reform, but it should retained because of the role it plays in adding progressivity
to the federal tax system. Moreover, in light of the progressive nature of the estate
tax, and the fact that one of the reasons Social Security faces a long-term deficit
is because the system redistributed income to the early generations of Social
Security beneficiaries, it seems appropriate to use a highly progressive tax, rather
than the regressive payroll tax, to fund this redistribution. Although an imperfect
fit, using legacies to pay for a legacy debt is an appealing idea.
Of course, using estate tax revenue to fund some Social Security benefits would
weaken the link between contributions and benefits and could erode public
support for the program. Nevertheless, I believe the program is “mature enough
to withstand an infusion of [estate tax] revenues without undermining its basic
principles.”136

132

John Engler, Death tax’ and folks who make things, Akron Beacon J. B2, 2006 WLNR
9792763 (June 8, 2006).
133
See, e.g., Gale and Slemrod, supra note 105, at 47–49 (describing favorable treatment of
family farms and businesses under pre-EGTRRA law); Repetti, supra note 106, at 866–68 (same).
134

Some contend that the claim that the estate tax harms farms and small businesses is nothing
more than a myth. See Geier, supra note 100, at 655 (“While commentators agree that there must
surely be some farm or small business somewhere that was, indeed, sold to pay estate taxes, no one
seems to have ever been able to find it.”); McCaffery, et al., supra note 103, at 1374 (“While there
are reports of businesses being sold to pay estate taxes, there is no work validating this. Some
anecdotal information suggests the contrary.”).
135

See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 100, at 175; Repetti, supra note 106, at 868–69; Ventry, supra
note 100, at 1168–69.
136

Munnell, supra note, 102, at 149.
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INVESTING A PORTION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST
FUND IN EQUITIES

Under current law, the assets of the Social Security trust fund must be invested
in U.S. government bonds.137 Over the last 75 years or so, the average annual total
after inflation rate of return on large corporate stocks has been about 7%,
compared to 2.3% on long-term government bonds.138 In the third part of their
three part plan, Ball and Altman propose that the law be amended to permit up to
20 percent of the assets of the Social Security trust fund to be invested in a broadly
diversified, indexed equity fund or funds139 to take advantage of this relatively
higher rate of return. They propose that the investment in equities be implemented
gradually, with one percent of assets invested in equities at the end of 2006, two
percent of assets at the end of 2007, and increasing by one percent each year until
20 percent of assets are invested in equities at the end of 2025.140 They propose
a separate limitation on total trust fund investments equal to 15 percent of the total
market value of all stocks.141 The Social Security actuaries project that the
Ball/Altman proposal to diversify the Trust Fund’s investments would reduce the
Social Security trust fund’s long-term projected deficit by 0.37 percent of taxable
payroll.142
At first blush, this proposal might appear to be a simple, costless fix to Social
Security’s long-term deficit. In fact, however, the proposal raises a number of
important issues and concerns. This section identifies and analyzes some of the
137

42 U.S.C. Sec. 401(d) (“Such investments may be made only in interest-bearing obligations
of the United State or in obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United
States.”).
138

Brian W. Cashell, Investing Social Security Funds in the Stock Market: Some Economic
Considerations, CRS Report for Congress RL32848 CRS-2 (April 12, 2005); Alicia H. Munnell and
Pierluigi Balduzzi, Investing The Social Security Trust Fund in Equities, AARP Public Policy
Institute Paper No. 9802, at 5 (March 1998); P. Brett Hammond and Mark J. Warshawsky, Investing
Social Security Funds in Stocks, Benefits Quarterly 52, 52 (3d Quarter 1997).
139

Ball, supra note 2, at 4–5; Altman, supra note 2, at 303–04.

140

Ball, supra note 2, at 4; Altman, supra note 2, at 303.

141

Altman, supra note 2, at 303.

142

Altman, supra note 2, at 303; Cf. Social Security Administration Memorandum, supra note
46, at 1–2 (noting that all three elements of Ball/Altman proposal would reduce deficit by 1.47
percent and attributing 0.61 percent reduction to increasing taxable wage base and 0.51 percent
reduction to federal estate tax provision). See also Alicia H. Munnell and Steven A. Sass, Social
Security and the Stock Market: How the Pursuit of Market Magic Shapes the System 5 (2006)
(noting that “[t]he Social Security actuaries . . . credit equities with their expected rate of return”
and do not adjust the return for risk when evaluating the financial impact of the proposed reform).
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most significant issues raised by the proposal.143
[1]

Greater Investment Risk

The fact that, over the long term, equity investments have provided a higher
rate of return than have bonds is often referred to as the equity premium.144 With
the equity premium comes higher risk.145 Specifically, investing a portion of the
Social Security trust fund in equities would subject the trust fund to two forms of
higher risk: (1) default risk, and (2) greater volatility around the mean.
Under current law, the assets of the Social Security trust fund must be invested
in special Treasury securities.146 Like marketable Treasury securities, special
Treasury securities are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government147 and thus are virtually free from risk of default.148 Equity investments, in
contrast, are subject to default risk. One need only recall Enron to recognize that
equity investments involve default risk.
143

For additional discussion of the issues raised by proposals to invest a portion of the Social
Security trust fund in private equities, see, for example, Benjamin A. Templin, Full Funding: The
Future of Social Security, 22 J. L. & Pol. 395 (2006) (arguing for full funding of Social Security
system); General Accounting Office, Social Security Financing: Implications of Government Stock
Investing for the Trust Fund, the Federal Budget, and the Economy, GAO/AIMD/HEHS-98-74
(April 1998) (identifying and analyzing host of issues); Alicia H. Munnell, Investing the Social
Security Trust Funds in Equities, AARP Public Policy Institute Paper No. 9802 (March 1998)
(identifying and analyzing 6 different issues); Lawrence J. White, Investing the Assets of the Social
Security Trust Funds in Equity Securities: An Analysis, 2 Investment Company Institute Perspective
(Number 4 May 1996) (identifying and briefly discussing 5 different issues); Report of the
1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security, Vol. II, Reports of the Technical Panel on Trends
and Issues in Retirement Savings, Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods, and Presentations
to the Council 84-87 (identifying variety of issues).
144
Cashell, supra note 138, at CRS-2 (“The difference between the yield on stocks and
relatively less risky investments such as Treasury bonds is known as the equity premium.”).
145

Munnell and Balduzzi, supra note 138, at 6 (“Of course, the equity premium comes with
higher risk, in the form of greater volatility around the mean. . .”).
146

The trust fund may invest in marketable Treasury and agency securities if the Managing
Trustee (the Secretary of the Treasurer) determines that purchasing such securities is “in the public
interest.” 42 U.S.C. 401(d). Although the Trust Fund has invested in marketable securities in the
past, such investments are rare. General Accounting Office, supra note 143, at 36 & n. 2 (April
1998) (“As of 1996, marketable Treasury securities represented only 0.009 percent of the trust
fund’s holdings.”).
147

42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d).

148

General Accounting Office, supra note 143, at 36. Although they are free from default risk,
they are subject to interest rate risk and inflation risk. Munnell and Balduzzi, supra note 138, at 6
n.10.
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In addition, Treasury securities provide a much more predictable rate of return
than do equity investments. Under current law, the interest rate on the special
Treasury securities must be equal, at the time of issue, to the average market yield
on outstanding marketable government securities not due or redeemable for at
least four years.149 The following figure, Figure 1,150 shows the 12-month real
rates of return on stocks and long-term government bonds, monthly from 1926
until 2003. It clearly illustrates the greater volatility of equity investments.

Short-term fluctuations, however, are generally not a significant concern for a
long-term investor. Rather, long-term trends are more relevant, and historical
evidence shows that as the holding period increases, the variation in the rates of
return of equity investments decreases. Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate this
phenomenon.151

For an argument that the special Treasury securities are in fact subject to default risk, see Templin,
supra note 143, at 413–14.
149

42 U.S.C. 402(d).

150

This figure was originally published in Cashell, supra note 138, at CRS-3.

151

Like figure 1, these figures were originally published in Cashell, supra note 138, at
CRS-4-CRS-6, as figures 3, 4, and 6.
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Thus, although the stock market is volatile in the short run, most commentators
agree that past experience suggests that this volatility is not a significant risk for
long-term investments,152 like the Social Security trust fund’s investment in
equities would be.
[2]

Who Should Bear the Investment Risk?

Although the volatility in the rates of return decreases over long holding
periods, investing a portion of the Social Security trust fund in the private equities
market undoubtedly involves some degree of risk.153 This raises the question: who

152

See, e.g., Francis X. Cavanaugh, The Truth about the National Debt: Five Myths and One
Reality 101 (1996) (“Although the stock market is volatile in the short run, the experience of the past
fifty years shows that this volatility is not a serious risk for long-term investments, such as retirement
funds.”); General Accounting Office, supra note 143, at 40 (“Short-run fluctuations are generally
less of a concern for a long-term investor who buys and holds investments.”).
See also Thomas E. MaCurdy & John B. Shoven, Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth, in Topics
in the Economics of Aging 61 (David Wise, ed. 1992) (showing that all stocks portfolio has yielded
a higher return than has an all bonds investment strategy for all careers exceeding twenty-five years);
Templin, supra note 143, at 420–21 (discussing study by Jeremy Siegel of 200 years of financial
data showing that a portfolio containing a broad based index of stocks had 80 percent chance of
outperforming a bond only portfolio in a ten year period, a 90 percent chance over a 20 year period,
and a 99 percent chance over a 30 year period); General Accounting Office, supra note 143, at 40
(“Given that from 1926 to 1996, there was no 20-year period in with a negative stock return, an
investor might reasonably expect to earn a positive return over 20 years.”).
153

See Thomas E. MaCurdy & John B. Shoven, Asset Allocation and Risk Allocation: Can
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should bear that risk. Some supporters of private accounts contend that it is
inappropriate for the trust fund to bear the risk; although, it would be acceptable
for individual workers to bear the risk through individual accounts. These
supporters of individual accounts contend that if the trust fund were to invest in
equities and the market were to experience a downturn, then all workers and/or
retirees would be inappropriately forced to bear market risk. They contend that a
system of individual accounts would be superior because only those workers who
elect to invest in equities would be subject to market risk.154
Other commentators, in contrast, argue that some assets in the Social Security
trust fund should be invested in equities precisely so that risk can be shared. They
assert that the young bear no risk under the current system, and some assets should
be invested in equities so that the young are forced to bear risk.155
[3]

Effect on Stability of Market

Any proposal to invest a portion of the Social Security trust fund in private
equities raises the question whether such an investment would overwhelm and
destabilize the market.156 The Ball/Altman proposal is designed to minimize any
such concerns. First, it provides that equity investments would be gradually
introduced with just one percent of trust fund assets being invested in equities
each year for 20 years.157 In addition, Ball and Altman propose a separate
Social Security Improve Its Future Solvency Problem by Investing in Private Securities?, in Risk
Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform 11 (John Y. Campbell and Martin Feldstein,
eds., 2001) (contending that switching from a policy of having the Social Security trust fund invest
solely in special issue Treasury bonds to one in which the trust fund holds some private equities
amounts to an asset swap and that exchanging ten or twenty year bonds for a stock portfolio would
worsen Social Security’s finances roughly 20 to 25 percent of the time); Martin L. Leibowitz and
William S. Krasker, The Persistence of Risk: Stocks versus Bonds Over the Long Term, 44 Financial
Analysts Journal 40–47 (Nov./Dec. 1988) (estimating that a stock portfolio has a 32 percent chance
of underperforming a bond portfolio over a 10-year horizon and a 21 percent chance over a 30-year
period).
154

See, e.g., Sylvester J. Schieber & John B. Shoven, Real Deal: The History and Future of
Social Security 379 (1999); White, supra note 143, at 12–13 & n.17 (Number 4 1996).
155

See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond, The Economics of Social Security Reform, in Framing the Social
Security Debate: Values, Politics, and Economics 38, 48–50 (R. Douglas Arnold, et al. eds. 1998)
See also Munnell and Balduzzi, supra note 138, at 7; General Accounting Office, supra note 143,
at 50–51 (“According to recent research, the increased risk of any shortfall if stock investing does
not work as expected would be borne largely by future taxpayers.”).
156

Munnell and Balduzzi, supra note 138, at 8.

157

Ball, supra note 2, at 4; Altman, supra note 2, at 303.
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limitation on total trust fund investments equal to 15 percent of the total market
value of all stocks.158 In 1997, Brett Hammond and Mark Warshawsky studied the
likely impact of the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council’s proposals on
the equities market. They found that the Council’s Maintain Benefits Plan’s
proposal to invest trust fund assets in equities, which was similar to the
Ball/Altman plan but proposed more than twice the amount of equity investment,159 would not overwhelm the equities market under most plausible circumstances.160
[4]

Effect on Economy

Many commentators contend that investing a portion of the Social Security
trust fund in private equities would have little to no effect on the economy.161
They describe such proposals as asset swaps. For example, Alan Greenspan has
said, “shifting social security trust funds to private securities, while likely
increasing income in the social security system, will, to first approximation,

158

Altman, supra note 2, at 303.

159

The Maintain Benefits Plan called for investing 2.67% of the trust funds assets in equities up
to a limit of 40% of the total trust fund assets. Hammond and Warshawsky, supra note 138, at 54;
Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security, Vol. I: Findings and Recommendations 25–26 (1997)
160

Hammond and Warshawsky, supra note 138, at 63.

161

See, e.g., Century Foundation Issue Brief 8, at 4 (“There is no reason why shifting a share
of the trust fund reserves from Treasury securities into stocks would either increase or decrease
economic growth. The change would not directly affect national saving, investment, capital stock,
or production. It is possible that government borrowing rates might have to rise slightly to induce
private investors to buy the securities that the trust funds would be eschewing for stocks. And private
savers might earn slightly lower returns because their portfolios would contain fewer common
stocks. And more government bonds — those that the trust funds no longer purchased. Still, most
analysts believe that these effects would be almost undectable.”); Robert Greenstein, Should a
Portion of Social Security Benefits be Invested in Equities?, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
10 (Feb. 23, 1999) (“the fact that the investment of trust-fund reserves in equities would not itself
boost the economy is not relevant to weighing the advantages and disadvantages of trust-fund
investment versus other Social Security proposals”); Munnell & Balduzzi, supra note 138, at 11
(“Investing the trust funds in equities should be viewed to a first approximation as a restructuring
with little impact on aggregate savings, investment, or national income.”); General Accounting
Office, supra note 143, at 53 (“The economic effects of government stock investing would likely be
minimal because stock investing by itself does not increase national saving.”); White, supra note
143, at 8 (“If the equity purchases simply accomplish a swapping of assets between the OASDI
Trust Funds and the general public . . . then there is a serious question as to whether there has been
any net gain from the perspective of the overall economy.”).
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reduce non-social security retirement income to an offsetting degree.”162 Laurence
S. Seidman wrote, “Portfolio diversification without fund accumulation would not
raise the capital accumulation in the economy; if social security holds more
corporate stock earning 6 percent and less government bonds earning 2 percent,
then the public will hold less corporate stock earning 6 percent and more
government bonds earning 2 percent.”163
A few economists, however, have found that trust fund diversification could
have real effects on the economy. They contend that once the heterogenity of
current asset ownership is taken into account, determining the economic effect of
investing a portion of the Social Security assets in equities becomes more
complex. 164
[5]

Government Control of Private Companies

Arguably the most significant issue raised by the Ball/Altman proposal to invest
a portion of the Social Security trust fund in private equities is the question
whether such investment would be subject to inappropriate political influence. 165
Critics of proposals to invest a portion of the Social Security trust fund in private
equities contend that direct trust fund investment could lead to inappropriate
government influence over companies. 166 Critics cite two basic types of concerns:
162

Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, Social Security, Before the Task Force on Social
Security of the Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate (Nov. 20, 1997). (“Without an increase in the
savings flow, private pension and insurance funds, among other holders of private securities,
presumably would be induced to sell higher-yielding stocks and private bonds to social security
retirement funds in exchange for lower yielding U.S. treasuries. This could translate into higher
premiums for life insurance and lower returns on other defined contribution retirement plans. This
would not be an improvement to our overall retirement system.”).
163

Laurence S. Seidman, Funding Social Security, Tax Notes 241, 242 (Oct. 12, 1998).

164

See Peter Diamond and John Geanakoplos, Social Security Investment in Equities, The
American Economic Review 1047 (Sept. 2003). See also Michael Leidy, Investing U.S. Social
Security Trust Fund Assets in Private Securities, IMF Working Paper WP/97/112 (Sept. 1997)
(contending that investing trust fund assets in private securities could have an impact on aggregate
savings and future output).
165

Diamond and Orszag, supra note 55, at 215 (“One of the most commonly raised concerns
about trust fund investment in stocks involves corporate governance.”).
166

See, e.g., Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, Outlook for the federal budget and
implications for fiscal policy, Before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate (Jan. 25, 2001) (“I
believe, as I have noted in the past, that the federal government should eschew private asset
accumulation because it would be exceptionally difficult to insulate the government’s investment
decisions from political pressures.”), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoadDocs/
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(1) the fear that the Social Security trustees might engage in social investing and
thus buy or sell the shares of stock of certain companies for political reasons
rather than economic reasons, 167 and (2) the fear that the trustees would use
stockholder voting power to try to exercise control over private companies. 168
Testimony/2001/20010125/default.htm; Munnell & Balduzzi, supra note 138, at 13 (“The major
opposition to investing the trust funds in equities, and a primary reason that part of the Advisory
Council proposed Personal Security Accounts, centers on concerns about government interference
with the allocation of capital in the economy and with corporate activity”); Report of the 1994-1996
Advisory Council on Social Security, Vol. II Reports of the Technical Panel on Trends and Issues
in Retirement Savings, Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods and Presentations to the
Council 86 (“[S]ome critics argue that the proposal to have equities in the Trust Funds would expose
people to additional political risk, in that government officials would have to select investment
options and might not make these decisions purely on risk-return criteria.”). See also Should the
Federal Government Invest Social Security Trust Funds, National Center for Policy Analysis Brief
No. 286 (March 22, 1999) (identifying political risks of government investing); White, supra note
143, at 15-19 (same).
167
See, e.g., Theodore J. Angelis, Investing Public Money in Private Markets: What are the
Right Questions, in Framing the Social Security Debate 287, 290 (R. Douglas Arnold, et al., eds
1998) (“The most common concern is that officials would select to satisfy social or political goals
rather than for their risk/return profiles”); Daniel J. Mitchell, Why Government-Controlled
Investment Would Undermine Retirement Security, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
1248, at 1, 3 (Feb. 5, 1999) (“Government-controlled investing opens the door to corruption by
allowing politicians to steer funds toward well-connected interest groups or campaign contributors.”
“Government-controlled investing invites “politically correct” decisions because politicians could
forego sound investments in unpopular industries (such as tobacco) to steer money toward feel-good
causes that are likely to lose money.”); Michael Tanner, The Perils of Government Investing, CATO
Institute Briefing Paper No. 43, at 4–5 (Dec. 1, 1998) (“Even if the government avoids directly using
its equity ownership to influence corporate governance, there is likely to be an enormous temptation
to allow political considerations to influence the type of investments that the government makes.”);
Krysztof M. Ostaszewski, Privatizing the Social Security Trust Fund? Don’t Let the Government
Invest, The Cato Project on Social Security Privatization No. 6 (Jan. 14, 1997) (“Even if the
proposed Social Security investments in stocks are truly meant to be passive with respect to social
policy, it is nearly impossible to imagine such a position being sustainable in the long run.”).
168

See, e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, Why Government-Controlled Investment Would Undermine
Retirement Security, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1248, at 3, 4 (Feb. 5, 1999)
(“Government-controlled investing would mean partial nationalization of major businesses, which
would allow politicians direct involvement in the economy.” “Government-controlled investing
invites crony capitalism — industrial policy that allows politicians to control the economy indirectly
by attempting to pick winners and losers.”); Tanner, supra note 168, at 4 (“Imagine the pressure
faced by a congress if the government were to own a significant interest in a company that was
threatening to close its plants and move overseas at the cost of thousands of jobs. Could politicians
really remain passive in the face of such political pressure?); Krysztof M. Ostaszewski, Privatizing
the Social Security Trust Fund? Don’t Let the Government Invest, The Cato Project on Social
Security Privatization No. 6 (Jan. 14, 1997) (“In essence, it is being proposed that the federal
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State and Local Government Pension Programs

The past experience of state and local government pension plans suggest that
these objections are not wholly illusory. There is clear anecdotal evidence that
state and local government pension programs have engaged in social investing. 169
For example, in the mid-1980s, many states passed laws that required state
pension funds to divest holdings in South Africa. 170 Similarly, a number of state
and local government pension plans have divested tobacco holdings due to
political pressure, 171 and some state pension funds have disallowed investments
in Iran, Cuba, and companies that comply with the Arab League’s boycott of
Israel. 172
Similarly, there is clear anecdotal evidence that state and local government
pension programs have used stockholder voting power to try to exercise control
over private companies. 173 Indeed, the California Public Employees’ Retirement
System (CalPERS), the largest public pension fund in the United States, is
well-known for its corporate governance reform. 174 CalPERS played a role in the
government use tax money to pick corporate winners and losers.”).
Critics may also raise a third objection, that is, such investments could create an inherent conflict
of interest if the government is both the regulator of business and a shareholder. See Templin, supra
note 143, at 431–32.
169

For a leading study on public pension fund activism, see Roberta Romano, Public Pension
Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (1993).
170

See Matthew Schaefer, The “Grey Areas” and “Yellow Zones” of Split Sovereignty Exposed
by Globalization: Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation, and Intrusion to Escape
an Era of Misguided “New Federalism,” 24 Can.-U.S. L. J. 35, 63 (1998). See, e.g., Board of
Trustees of Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Baltimore v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore City, 317 Md. 72 (1989) (upholding Baltimore city ordinances requiring city pension
funds to divest their holdings in companies doing business in South Africa).
171

Angelis, supra note 167, at 300.

172

Angelis, supra note 167, at 290 n.7.

173

Whether social investing and shareholder activism has actually affected the returns of public
pensions, however, is less clear. Compare Templin, supra note 143, at 435 (“Both anecdotal and
empirical data suggests that ‘social investing may adversely affect fund performance.’ ”) with David
Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of
Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 187, 217 (2005) (“The political
problems affecting public pension fund performance are not shareholder activism or social investing,
as the critics of public funds suggest, but that governments are using pension assets as a safety valve
against other budgetary problems.”).
174

Hess, supra note 173, at 188.
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removal of Michael Eisner as Chair of Walt Disney 175 and was active in an
attempt to remove the Chief Executive Officer of Safeway. 176
Thus, the past experience of some state and local government pension funds
lends credence to concerns regarding the ability of a public pension program to
withstand political pressure when making investment decisions. Nevertheless, the
experience of two other public pension systems, the Federal Thrift Savings Plan
of the Federal Employees Retirement System and the Canadian Pension Plan,
suggest that such pressures may not be insurmountable.
[b]

Federal Thrift Savings Plan

In 1986, Congress authorized the Federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), a
retirement and investment plan for federal employees. 177 The program was
specifically designed to insulate its investment decisions from political pressures.
178
Three separate elements of the program were developed to protect against
political influence: 179 (1) the program is administered by an independent and
neutral investment board, the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board; 180 (2)
the Board is subject to strict fiduciary duties; 181 and (3) investment choices are
narrowly limited. 182
Nominally, the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board falls within the
executive branch, 183 but the Board determines its own budget and submits it
directly to Congress. 184 The President appoints all five members of the Board and
selects the chairman, but the House and Senate each recommend one Board
member. 185 Once confirmed by the Senate, Board members cannot be removed
during their four-year term. 186 The Board cannot prescribe particular invest175

Id. at 189.

176

Id. at 206.

177

Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986, P. L. No. 99-335, Title I, Sec. 101(a),
100 Stat. 514, 541 (1986).
178

Angelis, supra note 167, at 293.

179

Angelis, supra note 167, at 293.

180

5 U.S.C. Sec. 8472.

181

5 U.S.C. Sec. 8477.

182

5 U.S.C. Sec. 8438.

183

5 U.S.C. Sec. 8472(a).

184

Angelis, supra note 167, at 293.

185

Angelis, supra note 167, at 293. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8472(b).

186

Angelis, supra note 167, at 293; 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8472(e)(1).
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ments, but it does select an executive director to implement its guidelines. 187 The
Board members serve on a part-time basis while the executive director manages
the day-to-day operations on a full-time basis and in accordance with statutorily
enumerated powers and policies established by the Board. 188
The plan’s fiduciaries are subject to fiduciary standards that are similar to
ERISA’s fiduciary standards. Fiduciaries are defined to include the members of the
board, executive director, and any other person who exercises discretionary
authority over the fund’s assets or would otherwise qualify as a fiduciary under
ERISA. 189 Like ERISA fiduciaries, TSP fiduciaries must discharge their duties
“solely in the interest of the [TSP’s] participants and beneficiaries.” 190 In
addition, the TSP incorporates ERISA’s prudent investor rule. 191 The Secretary of
Labor is authorized to enforce the fiduciary standards by filing a civil suit against
any fiduciary except a member of the Board or the executive director. 192
When Congress originally authorized the TSP, it established three separate TSP
investment funds: (1) the Government Securities Investment Fund (G Fund), (2)
the Common Stock Index Investment Fund (C Fund), and the Fixed Income
Investment Fund (F Fund). 193 In 1996, Congress approved two additional stock
index funds for the TSP: (1) an index of all companies, other than the Standard
and Poor 500 companies, actively traded in the U.S. stock market, and (2) an
index of major foreign corporations. 194 Members of the Board and TSP officials
are prohibited from voting shares of stock; the Board’s outside management votes
the shares. 195
Most analysts agree that, to date, the Federal Thrift Investment Board has not
taken any action that has reflected political considerations. 196 Indeed, Francis
187

Angelis, supra note 167, at 293.

188

Angelis, supra note 167, at 293–94.

189

5 U.S.C. Sec. 8477(a)(3).

190

5 U.S.C. Sec. 8372(b)(1).

191

5 U.S.C. Sec. 8477(b)(1)(C).

192

Angelis, supra note 167, at 294; 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8477(e)(3).

193

General Accounting Office, supra note 143, at 61.

194

General Accounting Office, supra note 143, at 61.

195

5 U.S.C. Sec. 8438(f).

196

See, e.g., Karen C. Burket & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privatizing Social Security:
Administration and Implementation, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1325, 1345 (2001); Angelis, supra
note 167, at 293; Investing the Social Security Trust Funds in Stocks, The Century Foundation Issue
Brief No. 8, at 3 (March 1, 1999); Tanner, supra note 168, at 7.
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Cavanaugh, the executive director of the board from 1986 to 1994, has said,
I encountered no significant problems as we selected an index (the S & P 500),
obtained competitive bids from large index fund managers, and established a
highly efficient stock fund with minimal administrative expenses. By 1996, 1
million federal employees had elected to invest $13 billion in the board’s
stock index fund. 197
Based on his experience with the TSP, Cavanaugh has said that he “see[s] no
reason why the Social Security trust fund should not have the same stock
investment advantage as the Thrift Savings Plan.” 198
[c]

Canada Pension Plan

In the late 20th century, Canada, like most industrialized nations, faced an aging
population and its pay-as-you-go earnings-related public pension plan, the Canada
Pension Plan (CPP), faced long-term solvency issues. 199 Canada decided to
address those issues by pre-funding the CPP and investing a major portion of the
accumulated assets in equities. 200 Thus, in 1997, the Canadian legislature created
the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), a quasi-independent
agency whose sole objective is to act in the best interest of plan participants, to
manage the investments. 201 The legislation established an elaborate set of
procedures to make the CPPIB as independent from the government as possible.
202
In addition, it instituted a set of internal and external review procedures to
assure efficiency, transparency, and public accountability. 203 “Because of the
explicit ‘institutional investor’ mandates included in the 1997 legislation and the
elaborate governance and reporting structures, the CPPIB is widely viewed as

197

Cavanaugh, supra note 152, at 101.

198

Cavanaugh, supra note 152, at 101.

199

Steven A. Sass, Reforming the Canadian Retirement System: Investing Social Security Assets
in Equities, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Global Issue in Brief No. 5, at 1
(April 2006).
200

Sass, supra note 199, at 5.

201

For a more detailed discussion of the CPPIB, see, for example, Munnell and Sass, supra note
142, at 115- 24; Sass, supra note 199; R. Kent Weaver, Whose Money Is It Anyhow?: Governance
and Social Investment in Collective Investment Funds, Center for Retirement Research at Boston
College Working Paper 2003-007 (May 2003)
202

Sass, supra note 199, at 6.

203

Sass, supra note 199, at 6.
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204

Safeguards in Ball/Altman Plan

In order to protect against inappropriate governmental interference in private
sector decisions, 205 Ball and Altman propose that the trust fund private equity
investments be done through a system with safeguards that are similar to those
found in the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board and the CPPIB. For
example, Ball and Altman would limit investments to a very broad index fund
(such as the Wilshire 5000) that reflects virtually the entire American economy. 206
In addition, they propose that the investments be directed “by a board structured
to ensure its impartiality and autonomy.” 207 Specifically, they propose the
creation of an independent agency, like the Federal Reserve Board, that would
have long and staggered terms. This agency would be charged with “selecting the
index fund, selecting the portfolio managers by bid from among experienced
managers of index funds, and monitoring and reporting to the trustees and public
on Social Security’s investments.” 208 Their proposal would prohibit Social
Security from voting any stock or influencing the policies or practices of any
company whose stock is held by the index. 209
[6]

Recommendation

I believe that the Ball/Altman proposal to invest a portion of the Social Security
trust fund in private equities is far superior to proposals to invest Social Security
assets in the equities market through individual accounts. First, private accounts
entail much higher administrative costs than do investments through a single fund.
210
Second, I believe that the risks and rewards of equity investments should be
204

Id. at 8.

205

Cf. Munnell and Balduzzi, supra note 138, at 13 (“Everyone involved in the debate
recognizes that having the government in the business of picking winners and losers and voting on
corporate proposals is undesirable. The issue therefore is not one of differing goals but whether
effective mechanisms can be established to ensure that the government does not interfere in private
sector decisions.”); Greenstein, supra note 161, at 1 (“Virtually all parties to this debate concur that
no Congressional or executive branch involvement should be allowed in investing Social Security
reserves in equities.”).
206

Altman, supra note 2, at 303.

207

Ball, supra note 2, at 4.

208

Ball, supra note 2, at 4.

209

Ball, supra note 2, at 4. See also Altman, supra note 2, at 303.

210

Greenstein, supra note 161, at 7 (noting that administrative costs for a system of private
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shared widely rather than borne on an individual by individual basis. 211 Finally,
as I discussed at length in my 2005 contribution to this Review, I believe that
individual accounts raise a host of other problems. 212 Thus, if any of Social
Security’s assets are to be invested in the equities market, I believe that the
investment should be done through the trust fund rather than through individual
accounts.
Whether any portion of the Social Security trust fund should be invested in
private equities is a more difficult question. I believe that the proposal has distinct
advantages. It offers the opportunity for higher returns, and ensures that those
higher returns (and risks) would be shared widely. Nevertheless, it raises
significant corporate governance issues. While past experience with state and
local government pension plans shows how substantial the risks may be, past
experience with the Federal Thrift Savings Plan 213 and the Canadian Pension
Plan suggests that the risk of inappropriate interference in the private markets can
be overcome. Accordingly, I believe the proposal merits serious consideration.
§ 22.05

CONCLUSION

The American Social Security system faces a long-term funding deficit, and
reform of the system appears inevitable. Robert Ball has proposed, and Nancy
Altman has endorsed, a three part plan that would bring the Social Security system
into close actuarial balance. Although the plan is not costless, it merits serious
consideration. There is simply no costless solution to Social Security’s long-term
funding deficit, and the benefits of the Ball/Altman plan (the most significant of
which is bringing the Social Security system within close actuarial balance)
outweigh its costs.
accounts with free investment choice could average about 20 percent of the value of account
balances compared to less than one percent for a system with central trust fund investments).
211
Cf. Diamond and Orszag, supra note 55, at 215 (“[I]nvesting in stocks allows risk to be
spread across generations. If the market should turn sharply down in some year, all generations
could be made to bear some of the burden if the investments were undertaken through the trust fund.
Under a system of individual accounts, some generations and individuals would bear the entire
burden while others would bear none. The trust fund may therefore be a more effective means of
absorbing risk than individual accounts.”).
212

Moore, supra note 93.

213

For a discussion of how investing the Social Security trust fund in equities would differ from
the TSP, see, e.g., Tanner, supra note 148, at 7–9; Angelis, supra note 167, at 296–99.
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